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FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE
OVEvVIw

I.
A.

STATUTES OF LMITATIONS IN CIVL RIGHTS CASES

Zuniga v. AMFA C Foods, Inc.'

In an action invoked under the jurisdiction of 42 U.S.C. §
1981,1 plaintiff Zuniga alleged he was discriminately refused
"bumping rights" by the defendant; these rights would have enabled plaintiff to continue working and retain his seniority. Plaintiff further averred that subsequent to termination of employment, he was wrongfully refused reinstatement. 3 The action
was dismissed by the district court on limitations grounds.'
The issue for the purposes of appeal was which statute of
limitations should be applicable to federal employment discrimination actions brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1981 in Colorado's federal district courts.' The three statutes mentioned in the district
court's statement, and later discussed in the court of appeals'
opinion, were the two-year "federal action" statute,' the threeyear "residuary" statute,' and the six-year statute governing spe'580 F.2d 380 (10th Cir. 1978).
Equal rights under the law. All persons within the jurisdiction of the
United States shall have the same right in every State and Territory to make
and enforce contracts, to sue, be parties, give evidence, and to the full and
equal benefit of all laws and proceedings for the security of persons and
property as is enjoyed by white citizens, and shall be subject to like punishment, pains, penalties, taxes, licenses, and exactions of every kind, and to
no other.
42 U.S.C. § 1981 (1976).
580 F.2d at 381-82.
d. at 381. The district court found the action barred by the statutes of limitation
under Cow. Rev. STAT. §§ 13-80-106 and 13-80-108(1)(b) (1973). For text of the statutes,
see notes 6&7 infra.
580 F.2d at 381.
Cow. Rzv. STAT. § 13-80-106 (1973).
Actions under federal statutes. All actions upon a liability created by a
federal statute, other than for a forfeiture or penalty for which actions no
period of limitations is provided in such statute, shall be commenced within
two years or the period specified for comparable actions arising under Colorado law, whichever is longer, after the cause of action accrues.
The relevant portion of Cow. Rzv. STAT. 0 13-80-108 (1973) states: "Actions barred
in three years. (1) The following actions shall be commenced within three years next after
the act complained of and not afterwards: . . .
(b) All other actions of every kind for which no other period of limitation is provided
for by law."
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cifically mentioned contract and tort actions.'
The court of appeals determined that a two-step approach
would be in keeping with prior decisions,9 stating that "the answer to our limitations question requires analysis of the essential
nature of the federal claim and comparison to similar state actions."10
Although both the "federal action" statute and the
"residuary" or "catch-all" statute are available to the plaintiff of
a federal civil rights claim, the Tenth Circuit concluded that
under Colorado's statutory scheme another longer statute must
be utilized if also applicable." The reasoning in Jackson v. Continental Oil Co.12 persuaded the court of appeals that "'[i]n an
employment discrimination case such as this, the facts will most
closely resemble either a contract or a tort suit.' "13Therefore, the
longer six-year limitation would govern."
First, to sustain their holding that the case at bar related to
a contract action, the Tenth Circuit relied on the Supreme
Court's broad construction of 42 U.S.C. § 1981 in Johnson v.
Railway Express Agency, Inc. 1'In Johnson, the Court resurrected
42 U.S.C. § 1981 to provide an alternate legal remedy to Title VII
CoLO. REV. STAT. § 13-80-110 (1973) states:

Actions barred in six years. (1) Except as otherwise provided in section 4-2725, C.R.S. 1973, the following actions shall be commenced within six years
after the cause of action accrues, and not afterwards:
(d) All actions of assumpsit, or on the case founded on any contract or
liability, express or implied;
(g) All other actions on the case, except actions for slander and for libel.
The court of appeals relied on Runyon v. McCrary, 427 U.S. 160, 180 (1976); Auto
Workers v. Hoosier Corp., 383 U.S. 696, 704-05 (1966); and O'Sullivan v. Felix, 233 U.S.
318, 324 (1914). In Runyon, the silence of Congress as to statutes of limitations under 42
U.S.C. § 1981 was interpreted to mean that federal policy would approve adoption of the
local limitation laws. Auto Workers previously had stated this concept as it applied to the
Labor Management Relations Act. O'Sullivan characterized civil rights actions by an
individual as remedial in nature and not penal. Therefore, the federal limitation governing
actions for civil fines, penalties, or forfeitures was inapplicable.
' 580 F.2d at 384.
Id. at 384-85, 387.
, No. 74-F-1209 (D.Colo. Nov. 9, 1976).
" 580 F.2d at 385 (quoting Jackson v. Continental Oil Co., No. 74-F-1209 (D.Colo.
Nov. 9, 1976)).
",580 F.2d at 385.
Is 421 U.S. 454 (1975).
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of the Civil Rights Act of 1964,11 stating that 42 U.S.C. § 1981
"on its face relates primarily to racial discrimination in the making and enforcement of contracts."'" The Tenth Circuit noted
that the plaintiff in Zuniga had averred breach of the collective
bargaining contract and denial of "bumping rights." Discriminatory acts dealing with enforcement of contract rights had therefore been alleged and the six-year limitations statute was applicable. 1
Secondly, the Tenth Circuit stated that the cause of action
also sounded in tort since employer discrimination interferes with
the personal right to contract; thus, the action would be "for the
tort growing out of the contract."" The plaintiff in Zuniga had
alleged injury because of his national origin and the court of
appeals held this to be "in effect and by nature, an action in tort
for trespass on the case." ' Again, the six-year limitations period
2
would control. '
Because the plaintiff's complaint asserted "tortious discriminatory acts infringing contractual rights, and denial of contractual rights as well,"" the action was timely under the broad provisions of the six-year statute of limitations. The motion to dismiss
was reversed and the case remanded for further proceedings.2
42 U.S.C. § 200e-5 (1976). For criticism of 01981 as an alternative remedy, see
Note, Filing of an Employment DiscriminationCharge Under Title WI as Tolling The
Statute of LimitationsApplicable To A 1981 Action: The Unanswered Questions of Johnson v. REA, 26 CAsz W. Rzs. L. Rsv. 889, 940-43 (1976), where the author argues that the
rebirth of 42 U.S.C. § 1981 has not remedied the existing problems of TitleVII, has instead
overburdened the judicial system, and that the individual's remedies should be returned
to pre-Johnsonstatus. However, in Larson, The Development of Section 1981 as a Remedy
for Racial Discriminationin Private Employment, 7 IHv. C.R.-C.L. L. Rzv. 56, 102
(1972), the author concludes that 42 U.S.C. § 1981 should be used as a remedy in conjunction with Title VII and that the problems relating "primarily to statutes of limitations,
exhaustion of remedies, the applicable substantive law, and scope of available remedies"
can be resolved by the courts.
" 421 U.S. at 459.
580 F.2d at 386.
Ahart v. Sutton, 79 Colo. 145, 148, 244 P. 306, 307 (1926). In-Ahart, the six-year
limitation was utilized in an action for fraud in real estate contracts.
0 580 F.2d at 386-87 (quoting from Wolf Sales Co. v. Randolf Wurlitzer Co., 105 F.
Supp. 506, 508 (D.Colo. 1952)). In Wolf, a two-year statute of limitations for a federal
antitrust claim was held to be discriminatory and therefore the six-year statute of limitations governed actions on the case. See 580 F.2d at 387 n.8, for a discussion of trespass
on the case (damage suffered for a wrong committed without force).
21 580 F.2d at 387.
" Id.
=Id.
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B.
Which Analogies Should Be Utilized in the Application of
Statutes of Limitations to Civil Rights Acts?
In the course of the decision to apply a six-year statute of
limitations to Zuniga, the Tenth Circuit considered various Colorado statutory periods which would bar a federal civil rights action,21 i.e., the "federal action" statute, the "residuary" statute,
and the contract/tort statute. The major problem is, however,
that the Tenth Circuit has inconsistently applied the conflicting
limitation statutes." Therefore, neither party can foresee which
analogy will be utilized by the court. The plaintiff cannot accurately predict whether his cause of action will be barred at the
outset solely on procedural grounds; and the defendant is exposed
to a claim until the running of the longest limitations statute
which could conceivably apply to a federal civil rights claim.
The problem is not unique to the Tenth Circuit." Other statutes in addition to those discussed by the Tenth Circuit have
been considered; a court is limited only by the types of provisions
on the states' books. At least three types of statutes not argued
in Zuniga have been determinative in other federal civil rights
" The Tenth Circuit also rejected AMFAC's argument that the six-month statute of
limitations under the Colorado Anti-Discrimination Act of 1957 (CoLo. REV.STAT. § 2434-307 (1973)) should apply. 580 F.2d at 384 n.5.
" Circuit Judge Holloway, in Zuniga, cited examples of Tenth Circuit federal civil
rights litigation which had been decided on the basis of each of the three statutes:
1. CoLO.Rsv. STAT. § 13-80-106 (1973). McKinney v. ARMCO Recreational Products
Co., 419 F. Supp. 464 (D. Colo. 1976) (Statute applicable to claims under 42 U.S.C. §§
1981 and 1985); Salazar v. Dowd, 256 F. Supp. 220 (D.Colo. 1966) (Statute applicable to
litigation under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983 and 1985. Longer limitations periods were not considered); Ray v. Safeway Stores, Inc., No. 75-W-459 (D.Colo. May 19, 1978), app. pending,
(suit under §§ 42 U.S.C. 1981 and 1983 was barred by this statute); Castro v. Patterson,
No. 74-M-1189 (D.Colo. Oct. 1, 1975).
2. CoLO. Rav. STAT. § 13-80-108(1)(b)(1973). Solano v. Sears Roebuck and Co., No.
75-A-931 (D.Colo. Aug. 24, 1976) (42 U.S.C. § 1981 action barred); Evans v. Dow Chemical
Co., No. 74-A-1210 (D.Colo. May 11, 1976) (42 U.S.C. § 1981 claim not brought within
limitation of statute).
3. CoLO. REv. STAT. § 13-80-110(1)(d) and (g) (1973). Jackson v. Continental Oil Co.,
No. 74-F-1209 (D. Colo. Nov. 9, 1976) (statute applied to claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1981
and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5).
" See Statutes of Limitations in Federal Civil Rights Litigation, 1976 Asuz. ST. L.J.
97. The Seventh Circuit has more consistently applied one limitations period, the residuary statute, to its federal civil rights claims. See Rinehart v. Locke, 454 F.2d 313 (7th
Cir. 1971)(42 U.S.C. § 1983); Waters v. Wisconsin Steel Works of Int'l Harvester Co., 427
F.2d 476 (7th Cir. 1970) (42 U.S.C. § 1981); Baker v. F&F Investment, 420 F.2d 1191 (7th
Cir.) (42 U.S.C. § 1982), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 821 (1970). But see Duncan v. Nelson, 466
F.2d 939 (7th Cir. 1972).
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claims in several circuits; and these also have been applied inconsistently."
Various remedies have been suggested to alleviate the confusion, including: enactment by Congress of a federal limitations
statute, development of principles by the Supreme Court which
lower courts could follow, consistent application of the existing
statutes, and utilization of statutes based on concepts other than
contract or tort analogies (since these are based on common law,
rather than statutory foundations).N
The Tenth Circuit has not followed any of the available
suggestions. Instead, as evidenced by the Zuniga ruling, it has
continued the confusion and unpredictability already present in
the area of limitations periods as applied to federal civil rights
claims.
II.

JURISDICTION

Pendent and Ancillary Jurisdiction
The discretionary power of the federal district courts to exercise pendent jurisdiction of state claims (over whom there is no
basis for independent jurisdiction) was affirmed by the Tenth
Circuit in Transok Pipeline Co. v.Darko.29 Even though the federal defendants settled before trial, the federal claim was substantial, and jurisdiction was reserved overthe state claim.s
The court of appeals found that ancillary federal jurisdiction
can be accorded to general water adjudication claims even though
many of the claimants have no rights under any federal statute.
A.

State limitations provisions not mentioned in Zuniga are:
1. Statutes governing actions for injuries to the person or rights of the person.

E.g., Almond v. Kent, 459 F.2d 200 (4th Cir. 1972); Jones v. Bombeck, 375 F.2d 737 (3d
Cir. 1967); Wilson v. Hinman, 172 F.2d 914 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 336 U.S. 970 (1949).
2. Those governing actions upon a liability created by statute. E.g., Rosenberg v.
Martin, 478 F.2d 520 (2d Cir. 1973); Smith v. Cremins, 308 F.2d 187 (9th Cir. 1962).
3. Special statutes for refiled actions after a dismissal other than on the merits, if the
case were deemed a refiled action. E.g., Crosawhite v. Brown, 424 F.2d 495 (10th Cir.
1970).
ation, 1976 Amz. ST. L.J. 97;
i
" Statutes of Limitations in Federal
Note, Filing of an Emploiment DiscriminationCharge Under Title VII as Tolling the
Statute of LimitationsApplicable to a 1981 Action: The Unanswered Questions of Johnson
v. REA, 26 CAsE W. Has. L. Rav. 889 (1976).
" 565 F.2d 1150 (10th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 98 S. Ct. 1876 (1978).
" Another consideration besides the substantiality of the federal claim was that
considerable time and energy had been expended in the case. 565 F.2d at 1155.
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In Reynolds v. Molybdenum Corp. of America,"' the United
States had, at first, been a named defendant. The federal government subsequently filed a complaint "in intervention," requesting jurisdiction "under 28 U.S.C. § 1345 which grants federal
jurisdiction over actions commenced by the United States."32 The
court of appeals looked to the principal purpose of the suit, determined that a general water adjudication was similar to an interpleader, realigned the United States as a plaintiff, and granted
federal jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1345.
B.

Subject Matter and PersonalJurisdiction

In Pedi Bares, Inc. v. P & C Food Markets, Inc., 33 the Tenth
Circuit ruled the "minimum contacts" test 34 for in personam jurisdiction was satisfied even though the contract action did not
arise "out of an act done or transaction consummated in the
forum state,"' and even though the initial solicitation was made
by the plaintiff." The controlling fact was that the defendant had
acted affirmatively on the plaintiff's telephone contract orders;
therefore, the transaction of business provision of the Kansas
7
long-arm statute applied.1
The Colorado statutory provision pertaining to the service of
process on a foreign corporation, 39 not the long-arm statute, was
pertinent to the decision in Budde v. Kenton Hawaii, Ltd. 31 The
court recognized the general rule that the activities which are the
basis of the action need not arise in the state as long as the instate service of the corporation's agent is proper.'"
3'

570 F.2d 1364 (10th Cir. 1978).

Id. at 1365.

567 F.2d 933 (10th Cir. 1977).
24 International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945).

Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 251 (1958).
567 F.2d at 937.
KA. STAT. § 60-308(b)(1) (Supp. 1975).
1 CoLO. Rav. STAT. § 13-1-124 (1973).
565 F.2d 1145 (10th Cir. 1977). As discussed in Budde, two actions by the plaintiff,
who had been injured in a jeep accident in Viet Nam, had already been dismissed on
limitations grounds. Budde v. Ling-Temco-Vought, Inc., 511 F.2d 1033 (10th Cir. 1975);
Budde v. Insurance Co. of N.A., 502 F.2d 783 (5th Cir. 1974).
" 565 F.2d at 1149. Other cases decided by the Tenth Circuit in keeping with general
jurisdictional rules were United States v. Blackwood, Nos. 78-1358, 78-1359, and 78-1360
(10th Cir. Aug. 28, 1978) (issue not raised at district court cannot be raised upon appeal);
Stewarts Sec. Corp. v. Guaranty Trust Co., No. 76-2067 (10th Cir. 1978) (dismissal based
on lack of jurisdiction is not an adjudication of the merits even though dismissal order
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The Law Applied Under Diversity Jurisdiction

Oklahoma state law prohibits declaratory judgments which
would determine the liability of insurers," but the Tenth Circuit,
in FarmersAlliance Mutual Insurance Co. 6. Jones," ruled that
this does not bar a similar suit in the federal courts. One of the
federal policies underlying the Federal Declaratory Judgments
Act 43 is that insurers should be provided a forum in which their
liability can be declared. The Declaratory Judgments Act is
thereby viewed as procedural." Based on the doctrine of Erie v.
Tompkins,4 and federal policies, 8 the Tenth Circuit allowed the
federal interpleader action.

III.
A.

FEDERA

RULES OF CIML PROCEDURE

Discovery

Three major cases discussed the power of the district courts
to order a party to produce documents and persons for deposition
under rule 3447 and impose sanctions under rule 37.48
Judge McWilliams' opinion in In re Westinghouse Electric
Corp. Uranium Contracts Litigation" stated that district courts
did not state whether it was to be with or without prejudice); Monks v. Hetherington, 573
F.2d 1164 (10th Cir. 1978) (possibility of federal defense to a state claim does not confer
federal jurisdiction); Korgich v. Regents of N.M. School of Mines, No. 77-1932 (10th Cir.
Aug. 16, 1978) (dismissal of action based on eleventh amendment is final disposition of
the case and appealable).
" OA. STAT. tit. 11 § 1651, (Supp. 1975).
, 570 F.2d 1384 (10th Cir. 1978).
13 28 U.S.C.
§ 2201 (1976).
" 6A Mooa's FEDwEAL PuAcr c § 57-23, at 57-237 (1974).
"0 304 U.S. 64'(1938). Under this doctrine, the federal court must apply the same
substantive law that a state court would apply but must apply federal procedural law.
4 The Erie rule concerning substance versus procedure is not correctly applied in
the instant case. The better rule was stated in Castro v. Arkansas-Louisiana Gas Co., 562
F.2d 622 (10th Cir. 1977). "Since Erie, the federal courts have undertaken to determine
whether a matter is subject to state or federal law and a state pronouncement as to
whether a question is substantive or procedural is not binding." Id. at 624.
"Fm). R. Civ. P. 34 allows a party to serve a request on any other party to inspect
and copy any designated documents.
" Ftn. R. Civ. P. 37 allows a party to apply for an order' compelling discovery.
, 563 F.2d 992 (10th Cir. 1977). As part of its discovery for the cause of action by the
same name in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia, defendant Westinghouse caused a subpoena to issue in Utah on Rio Algom Corp., which
operates a uranium mine in Utah. The major issue in the Virginia trial is whether the
increase in the price of uranium, which allegedly caused Westinghouse to breach its
contracts for the delivery of uranium, was caused by the price fixing of a uranium cartel.
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do have the power to require production of foreign documents and
production of foreign persons for depositions. But whether or not
the district court may impose sanctions when the production may
also impose criminal sanctions in the foreign country calls for a
"balancing" approach on a case-by-case basis. 0 The Tenth Circuit relied heavily on Societe InternationalePour Participations
Industrielles et Commerciales, S.A. v. Rogers5 and section 39 of
the Restatement (Second) of Foreign Relations Law of the United
States. Upon consideration of the facts of Westinghouse, the
court of appeals found that it was not unreasonable for Canada
to refuse to enforce letters rogatory when compliance would have
violated Canadian public policies as expressed in uranium information securities regulations. Further, there was no evidence to
suggest that the Canadian government or the Canadian court
had not acted in good faith. Instead, it was determined that Canada had a legitimate interest in the nondisclosure of information
which was based in Canada.52 The Tenth Circuit vacated the
district court's order holding the defendant in contempt and imposing sanctions."
A similar set of facts regarding documents in a foreign country was encountered in Ohio v. Arthur Andersen & Co.5" Citing
In re Westinghouse, the Tenth Circuit ruled that Andersen had
not acted in good faith and the balancing test was on Ohio's
side.s
In a companion case to the above uranium litigation,
Rio Algom had complied with most of the subpeona, but it refused to produce certain
documents in Canada and to produce the company president for further depositions.
'
563 F.2d at 997.
" 357 U.S. 197 (1958). In Societe, the Supreme Court found that the failure of the
petitioner to produce documents was not because of circumstances they could control nor
because of their conduct.
11 563 F.2d at 998-99.
Judge Doyle dissented (563 F.2d at 1000). He felt there were enough reasons to infer
that the Canadian regulations were promulgated solely to protect Canada's uranium
industries from insufficient prices. Given the importance of discovery, Judge Doyle would
only accept certain privileges as an excuse for noncompliance.
570 F.2d 1370 (10th Cir. 1978). In Ohio, Arthur Andersen & Co., after being served
with a request for production of documents, raised the "foreign law" issue regarding
documents in Switzerland. Six months after the district court ordered Andersen to specify
the applicable foreign secrecy laws with "great particularity and specificity," Andersen
said it had been taken by surprise and was sending a lawyer to consult with Swiss
counsel.
Id. at 1373.
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Westinghouse Electric Corp. v. Adams,K the Tenth Circuit ruled
that a party could be relieved from an improvident stipulation
regarding discovery. Citing the strong policy factor for discovery,
the court held that it would be inequitable to enforce the stipulation against further questioning of Mr. Adams by Westinghouse
once potentially critical events came to light. 7
B.

Intervention-Rule 24

In National Farm Lines v. ICC,5 an association representing
regulated common carriers sought to intervene under Rule 24(a).59
The plaintiff National Farm Lines was an unregulated agricultural cooperative testing the constitutionality of certain ICC rulings. The rulings had been promulgated to protect the regulated
carriers from unregulated competition." Reversing the district
court's decision, the Tenth Circuit allowed the association to intervene based on two arguments. First, the court held that it is
difficult for a government agency to adequately protect the interest of the public as well as the right of the private petitioner in
intervention. Secondly, the petitioner in intervention possessed
experience and access to facts about a complex area of business
which the government may not have had.'
In the certified class action of Shump v. Balka,6 2 plaintiffs
were seeking relief against the Topeka Housing Authority under
42 U.S.C. §§ 1402 and 1437, whereby rentals and payments of
public housing tenants are controlled. The plaintiffs in a related
action against the officers of the Topeka Housing Authority requested intervention in Shump. This was denied by the trial
570 F.2d 899 (10th Cir. 1978).
Id. at 902
564 F.2d 381 (10th Cir. 1977).
FzD. R. Civ. P. 24(a) allows anyone to intervene where there is an interest which
will be impaired or impeded by the disposition of the case unless the interest is adequately
represented by existing parties. (emphasis added).
564 F.2d at 382.
' Id. at 383-84. National Farm Lines was cited as determinative in the subsequent
case of Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. United States Nuclear Regulatory
Comm'n, 578 F.2d 1341, 1345-46 (10th Cir. 1978) (Kerr-McGee and the American Mining
Congress were allowed to intervene in a cause of action determining the necessity for a
New Mexico agency to issue environmental impact statements before issuing licenses for
uranium mines).
- 574 F.2d 1341 (10th Cir. 1978).
0 Id. at 1342.
'7
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court and affirmed by the Tenth Circuit."4 The reasoning was that
the two actions differed because plaintiffs in the related action
were seeking additional relief, and further, failed to produce evidence of collusion in the settlement of the Shump action. "
C. Class Action-Rule 23
5 the court of
In Bowe v. Firstof Denver Mortgage Investors,"
7
appeals reiterated that denial of class action is interlocutory and
not appealable unless plaintiffs make a showing that the case will
not proceed in the absence of class certification. The plaintiff in
Bowe had declared she would proceed individually with her
claim. The certification denial was therefore not appealable until
final judgment. 8
In Garcia v. Board of Education,School DistrictNo. 1, Den9 the Tenth Circuit restated that collateral attacks
ver, Colorado,"
on class action judgments should be discouraged because the policy behind a class action suit is to finally determine numerous
claims. 0 The suit was related to Keyes v. School DistrictNo. 1,11
and since the problem of whether Hispanic schools should be
included in that desegregation case was adjudicated, and the
plaintiffs of the instant case had adequate representation in
Keyes, it was determined that the issue should not be reopened.72
Jo Anna Goddard
U

The Tenth Circuit let stand a district court ruling that the two claims should not

be consolidated. Id. at 1344.
" Id. at 1345.
" 562 F.2d 640 (10th Cir. 1977).
" See Seiffer v. Topsy's Int'l, Inc., 520 F,2d 795 (10th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 423
U.S. 1051 (1976); Monarch v. Wilshire, 511 F.2d 1073 (10th Cir. 1975).
" 562 F.2d at 644-45.
0 573 F.2d 676 (10th Cir. 1978).
" Id. at 679. Cf. In Re Four Seasons Sec. Laws Litigation, 502 F.2d 834 (10th Cir.),
cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1034 (1974).
71313 F. Supp. 61 (D. Colo. 1970), rev'd in part, 445 F.2d 990 (10th Cir. 1971), modified and remanded, 413 U.S. 189 (1973), on remand, 368 F. Supp. 207 (D. Colo. 1973) and
380 F. Supp. 673 (D. Colo. 1974), rev'd in part, 521 F.2d 465 (10th Cir. 1975), cert. denied,
423 U.S. 1066 (1976).
11573 F.2d at 679-80.

